Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Estimated cost of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Note by the Secretariat

1. In order to promote greater financial transparency and accountability and taking into account the practice of multilateral and other organizations, the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at its second session, decided to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide a financial report to the Review Conference and each session of its Preparatory Committee, to be circulated as an official document. This practice, which is continuing throughout the 2020 review cycle, has proved to be very beneficial in addressing some of the financial issues experienced in the past.

2. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee, held at Vienna from 2 to 12 May 2017, the Committee requested the Secretariat to provide for its second session an estimate of the costs of the 2020 Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee (see NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/15). Pursuant to that request, the Secretariat submits herewith a summary of the estimated costs of the 2020 Review Conference, including the three sessions of its Preparatory Committee.

3. Further to the oral statement made in connection with General Assembly resolution 70/28, the costs associated with the preparation and holding of the 2020 Review Conference and the sessions of its Preparatory Committee should not have financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations. These activities will be undertaken by the Secretariat only after sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties. In addition, all final assessments that are outstanding for previous review conferences of the parties to the Treaty and the Preparatory Committee should be remitted by the States parties to the Secretariat as soon as possible. Timely receipt of contributions from States parties would ensure that the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference can be held as planned in accordance with the calendar of conferences.

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I. Estimated programme costs

4. The estimates of the programme costs provided in the annex relate to the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee and to the 2020 Review Conference itself and are based on notional costs. The cost of documentation is a major component of the estimates provided herein.

5. The notes verbales sent by the Secretary-General to the Permanent Missions of the States parties to settle their accounts for the first session and to request advance payments for the second session reflect the continuing trend towards an increasing level of documentation being submitted by the States parties, the demands this places on the Secretariat, and the increasing cost of holding the Preparatory Committee sessions and the Review Conference.

6. Since all expenditures relating to the aforementioned meetings have no financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations, the Secretary-General will be obliged also to request advance payment for both the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference, based, inter alia, on the workload statistics for conference servicing of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Conference, as well as of the 2015 Review Conference.

7. The estimates have been compiled taking into account the decision of the Preparatory Committee, at its first session, that the working languages of the Conference and its preparation would be Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish (see NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/15). The Committee also decided that summary records would be provided, at each session, for the Committee's opening meeting, the general debate and the closing meeting, a total of five meetings, and that there would be records of decisions taken at the other meetings. Without prejudice to an eventual decision by the Preparatory Committee, the estimates also include the provision of summary records for the 2020 Review Conference itself.

8. In addition, in anticipation of a request from the Preparatory Committee to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other intergovernmental organizations to prepare a number of background papers dealing with various aspects of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the estimates take into account the costs involved in the preparation and processing of those papers, it being understood that the final costs relating to background documentation will depend on the total number of pages produced.

9. The estimates also include provision for editing, documents control and documents distribution officers; sound/recording technicians and messengers; and security officers and access passes.

10. The significance of the 2020 Review Conference and its preparatory process necessitates the involvement of an adequate number of Secretariat staff. Requirements associated with staff costs estimated at a minimal level of $483,673 would cover (a) provision under temporary assistance for 36 work-months of General Service (Other level) staff to assist in all administrative arrangements for the uploading of documents to the Treaty website and secretarial support related to the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference; (b) travel and subsistence allowance of four staff, including the Secretary of the Preparatory Committee, from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, in connection with servicing the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee; two staff from the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in connection with the servicing of the first session of the Preparatory Committee; one staff member from the Geneva Branch of the

Office for Disarmament Affairs in connection with the servicing of the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference; two staff from IAEA in connection with servicing the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference; travel and subsistence allowance for the Secretary of the Preparatory Committee to provide substantive support to the Chair of the first, second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee and to the President of the Conference in connection with their consultations with States parties.

11. The Conference is expected to raise considerable interest among the press and other media representations and the public at large. Therefore, the provision of $31,917 is included to ensure adequate press coverage of the plenary meetings of the Conference. In addition, $33,346 has been earmarked for the design and development of a Treaty web page in six languages and the webcast coverage. Furthermore, the provision of $17,000 is made for the production of a press kit in English and French. The total expenses related to press coverage and public information activities amount to $82,263.

12. The provision of $22,546 for miscellaneous supplies and services, such as the rental of photocopiers and engineering costs for PowerPoint presentations and side events, has been included for the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference. There is also the provision of $5,000 for overtime pay.

II. Estimated programme support costs

13. Under established policy, the United Nations levies a charge, at a rate of 13 per cent of expenditure, for activities, such as the 2020 Review Conference, financed from extrabudgetary sources, to defray administrative and other support costs incurred in their implementation. Accordingly, the provision of $795,240 is included in the estimates to offset administrative and other support costs incurred for the servicing of the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

III. Reserve for contingency

14. In accordance with established policies and procedures in the United Nations, the provision of $871,312, corresponding to 15 per cent of the estimated costs, has been made for a contingency reserve to cover eventual shortfalls and final expenditures.

15. It should be noted that the costs provided in the present note are estimated on the basis of past experience and anticipated workload. Final costs such as those reported for the first session of the Preparatory Committee will be determined after the conclusion of the remaining sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference when the actual workload is known. At that time, it is expected that adjustments warranted in the contributions of the participating States parties sharing the costs will be made accordingly.

Annex

Estimates of conference- and non-conference-servicing costs of the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee

(In United States dollars)

	First session of the Preparatory Committee (New York and Vienna) (final costs)	*Second session of the Preparatory Committee (New York and Geneva) (estimates)*	*Third session of the Preparatory Committee (New York) (estimates)*	*2020 Review Conference (New York) (estimates)*	*Total*
I. Conference-servicing costs					
Pre-session, in-session and post-session documentation (Vienna, Geneva, New York)	795 256	630 500	591 700	1 249 738	3 274 207
Meeting services (Vienna, Geneva, New York)	16 555	107 005	50 149	104 535	278 244
Summary records		144 970	102 460	614 760	862 190
Background papers to be prepared and translated by IAEA				75 242	75 242
Other requirements		182 680	183 120	366 240	732 040
Central support costs	16 307	24 433	6 850	40 650	88 240
Security requirements	14 838	26 980	48 892	129 892	220 602
Total I	**842 956**	**1 116 568**	**983 171**	**2 581 057**	**5 523 752**
II. Non-conference-servicing costs					
Temporary assistance (36 work months)	70 652	70 500	70 700	75 200	287 052
Travel and DSA for substantive staff from ODA and IAEA	59 098	53 873	33 730	49 920	196 621
Press coverage and public information activities				82 263	82 263
Overtime		1 500	1 500	2 000	5 000
Miscellaneous supplies and services	4 046	6 000	6 000	6 500	22 546
Total II	**133 795**	**131 873**	**111 930**	**215 883**	**593 482**
Total (I+II)	**976 752**	**1 248 441**	**1 095 101**	**2 796 940**	**6 117 234**
III. Programme support costs	126 978	162 297	142 363	363 602	795 240
Total (I+II+III)	**1 103 730**	**1 410 738**	**1 237 464**	**3 160 542**	**6 912 474**
IV. Contingency		211 611	185 620	474 081	871 312
Total (I+II+III+IV)	**1 103 730**	**1 622 349**	**1 423 084**	**3 634 623**	**7 783 786**

Abbreviations: DSA, daily subsistence allowance; ODA, Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

6 March 2018

Original: English

Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Switzerland

Introduction

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Maintaining its integrity is key to international security. All States parties to the Treaty share the responsibility to uphold its credibility.

2. The 64 actions contained in the action plan and the practical steps for the Middle East adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, together with the Final Documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, represent the Treaty's latest acquis. Switzerland is of the view that the action plan should be viewed not as an end itself, but rather as a means to move towards the full implementation of the Treaty. Transforming this acquis swiftly into concrete results will be essential for upholding the Treaty's credibility.

3. At the ninth Review Conference, in 2015, Switzerland called for an assessment of the implementation of the 2010 action plan, advocating that the plan be updated by taking stock of its achievements to date and that it be developed further where appropriate. Specifically, Switzerland called for efforts to accelerate the pace of implementation of actions during the 2015–2020 cycle. Switzerland regrets that, owing to the failure of the Review Conference, parties to the Treaty could not give direction and renewed momentum to the plan's implementation.

4. Step 12 of the 13 practical steps agreed to by all States parties to the Treaty at the 2000 Review Conference calls for regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This call was reiterated in action 20 of the action plan. In line with this commitment, and with a view to enhancing transparency and building confidence, Switzerland submits the present report on aspects related to its implementation of the Treaty, of the 13 practical steps and of the action plan.

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Implementation

Action	*Measures taken*

Nuclear disarmament

1. *All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.*

   The stigmatization of the use of nuclear weapons and their eventual prohibition and verifiable elimination are policy objectives of Switzerland. Switzerland encourages and supports unilateral and bilateral efforts to reduce existing arsenals, while also playing an active role in the relevant multilateral forums.

   At the multilateral level, the immediate focus lies on fully implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Switzerland takes a pragmatic and balanced approach to promoting the Treaty's three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. While much has been achieved with regard to non-proliferation, there has been a distinct lack of progress in relation to disarmament goals. Differing viewpoints regarding how the disarmament obligations set forth in the Treaty are to be implemented have an adverse effect on this key instrument and could undermine its stability in the long term.

2. *All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.*

   Switzerland has long supported verifiability, irreversibility and transparency as core principles of nuclear disarmament. Switzerland is concerned that some measures undertaken with a view to modernizing nuclear arsenals may not be compatible with the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. The same concern applies to the revision of nuclear postures.

3. *In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.*

   Switzerland welcomes the fact that significant reductions have been made in nuclear arsenals since the height of the cold war, but is concerned that the disarmament process has slowed down in recent years. Switzerland stresses that the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals requires further reductions of all types of nuclear weapons.

4. *The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.*

   Switzerland welcomes the implementation of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and encourages the parties to preserve the achievements by extending the Treaty beyond its expiration in 2021. Switzerland also encourages Russia and the United States to enter negotiations to achieve

Action	*Measures taken*

deeper cuts, on all types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with action 4. Switzerland stresses the need to preserve existing arms control agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

5. *The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:*

(a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;

(b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;

(c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

(d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;

(e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

(f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and

(g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the above undertakings to the Preparatory Committee at 2014. The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.

Switzerland is concerned about the lack of progress on all issues covered by action 5. Action 5 being the principal measure guiding disarmament steps of a practical nature, significant progress in this area, or lack thereof, has a direct impact on the credibility of the so-called step-by-step-process.

For example, there has been no progress since 2010 on diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national military doctrines and recently issued doctrines seem to be moving in the opposite direction. No progress has materialized either on reducing stockpiles of non-strategic weapons. In this context, we can only call upon the nuclear-weapon States to move towards a rapid reduction of the entirety of their arsenals during the present review cycle.

Switzerland has long devoted special attention to the subject of reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons. This is an important and urgent interim measure on the path to nuclear disarmament, for which there has been growing support in recent years.

6. *All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.*

Switzerland supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament. Switzerland was

Action	Measures taken
	prepared to join consensus on all draft programmes of work submitted so far in the Conference.
7. *All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.*	Switzerland supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances. Switzerland was prepared to join consensus on all draft programmes of work submitted so far in the Conference.
8. *All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.*	Not applicable.
9. *The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon- free zone treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.*	Switzerland stands ready to support efforts towards establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, either by providing material support for the negotiations or through other means.
10. *All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.*	Switzerland is concerned by the limited progress achieved regarding implementation of this action, and in particular by the absence of steps towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so.
11. *Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and*	

Action	*Measures taken*
	all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.
	Switzerland signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 1 October 1999.
12. *All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.*	Switzerland has participated actively in the Conferences held in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.
13. *All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.*	Switzerland called upon Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty in bilateral meetings at the regional and global levels in relevant forums.
14. *The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.*	Switzerland maintains an auxiliary seismic station of the international monitoring system and actively supports the elaboration of the system through its participation in Working Group B of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.
15. *All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.*	Switzerland supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Switzerland was prepared to join consensus on all draft programmes of work submitted so far in the Conference.
16. *The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military*	

Action	Measures taken

purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

Not applicable.

17. *In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.*

Nothing to report.

18. *All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.*

Switzerland does not operate any facility that produces fissile material.

19. *All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.*

Together with Norway and a cross-regional group of States, Switzerland submitted a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly in 2016 under which was established a group of governmental experts nuclear disarmament verification (NDV). Switzerland will participate in the work of the group of governmental experts. Switzerland has also been an active member of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

20. *States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.*

Switzerland supports all efforts aimed at providing greater transparency.

21. *As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.*

Switzerland encourages nuclear-weapon States to make use of the draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form as a template for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities by the nuclear-weapon States.

Action	*Measures taken*

22. *All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.*

Switzerland supports various projects and activities that contribute directly or indirectly to disarmament and non-proliferation education. For instance, Switzerland supports the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the non-governmental organization Reaching Critical Will, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies. Switzerland also regularly hosts the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme for a "Swiss Day" in Bern.

23. *The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.*

Switzerland supports universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear non-proliferation

24. *The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.*

Switzerland's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA has been in force since 6 September 1978, the additional protocol has been in force since 1 February 2005, and Switzerland has received its broader conclusion for 2015 and integrated safeguards by 2017 with a State-level approach in force since 1 January 2018.

25. *The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.*

Switzerland has consistently underlined the need to universalize safeguards by calling upon States parties that have not yet done so to bring into force without delay IAEA comprehensive safeguards for all source or special fissionable material in all their peaceful nuclear activities in accordance with article III of the Treaty.

26. *The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.*

Since 2015, the IAEA has concluded on an annual basis that all nuclear material in Switzerland remains in peaceful activities. Switzerland's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, together with broader conclusion and integrated safeguards, provide the highest level of confidence that Switzerland is in compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Action	*Measures taken*

In global terms, however, the risk of proliferation remains significant, as illustrated by several unresolved cases that continue to challenge the Treaty regime. The international community must therefore redouble its efforts to ensure the ongoing success of this pillar. Switzerland has stated in various forums that future proliferation would raise crucial questions for international peace and stability. Switzerland therefore calls upon States that have caused proliferation concerns to fully comply with their non-proliferation obligations by addressing all matters of non-compliance with their safeguards obligations in order to uphold the authority of the safeguards system. Switzerland is convinced that only a diplomatic approach to proliferation cases will lead to a long-term solution acceptable to all sides.

27. *The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.*

Switzerland welcomed the entry into force on 16 January 2016 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear programme and considers this a historic success and a positive development towards strengthening the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

It is crucial that the IAEA be in a position to play its neutral and impartial role with respect to its verification tasks in order to achieve successful implementation of the agreement. Switzerland supported the IAEA in this work through extrabudgetary contributions. Switzerland encourages all parties involved to continue to fully honour their obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to refrain from any actions that would run counter to the objectives of this agreement.

Switzerland strongly condemns the nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and calls on the DPRK to respect both the Security Council resolutions as well as IAEA General Conference resolutions. We further call on the DPRK to rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

28. *The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.*

Switzerland signed the additional protocol with the IAEA on 16 June 2000, and it entered into force on 1 February 2005.

Switzerland welcomes the fact that, as of May 2017, 129 States parties have brought an additional protocol into force. Switzerland encourages all States parties that have not yet done so — in particular those with significant nuclear activities — to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol with the IAEA as soon as possible and to implement it provisionally pending its entry into force.

29. *The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties*

Action	Measures taken

to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.

Switzerland has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to its agreement with the IAEA. Switzerland is of the view that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, should constitute the safeguards standard and that such a standard is of great relevance, in particular for States with an advanced nuclear programme. Experience shows that the IAEA needs such a combination of tools to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities within a State.

Switzerland further encourages the Board of Governors of the IAEA to update the list of specified equipment and non-nuclear material for the reporting of exports and imports according to article 2.a, as contained in INFCIRC/540, according to the latest revision of the Trigger list, as contained in INFCIRC/254, Part 1.

30. *The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.*

Switzerland would like to stress that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. Meanwhile, a voluntary offer agreement should be based on the model safeguard (INFCIRC/153) and additional protocol (INFCIRC/540).

31. *The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.*

Not applicable.

32. *The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.*

Switzerland will continue to support the conceptual efforts of the IAEA aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system. It is indeed the view of Switzerland that — with the growing commitments of IAEA in the fields of safeguards and nuclear safety and security — it is of the utmost interest for IAEA to focus its efforts and resources where needed and to put in place smarter safeguards. Switzerland further supports the development and implementation of a less mechanistic safeguards system that better takes into account State-specific factors.

33. *The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.*

Action	Measures taken

Switzerland paid its 2017 assessed contribution to the IAEA regular budget and its voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund on time and in full.

34. *The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.*

In recent years, Switzerland has participated as an observer in the ASTOR (Application of Safeguards to Geological Repositories) Group of Experts.

35. *The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.*

Switzerland is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. In accordance with its non-proliferation commitments made in these and other export control regimes and relevant international treaties, and in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), Switzerland has in place national export control legislation and regulations. On the basis thereof, the Swiss authorities operate an effective export control (licensing) practice.

36. *The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.*

Switzerland regularly updates its national export control legislation and regulations in accordance with changes agreed upon in multilateral export control regimes, of which it is a member. See also response to action 35.

37. *The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.*

Switzerland's export control authority takes into account whether a recipient state has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force. Any exports of controlled items are denied if there is proof or reason to believe that the item is intended for use in a programme of weapons of mass destruction or an unacceptable risk of diversion to such a programme exists.

38. *The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.*

Switzerland has consistently affirmed its support for the development and exchange of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes.

39. *States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in*

Action	*Measures taken*

conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

Transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation are fully in line with Switzerland's national export control legislation and take into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. See also response to action 35.

40. *The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.*

Switzerland is convinced that strengthening nuclear security deserves the commitment of all States parties to the Treaty. Switzerland is therefore a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to its amendment, to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Switzerland also actively participated in the Nuclear Security Summits and the Nuclear Security Contact Group. Switzerland participated actively in the second IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, held in December 2016. While recognizing the fundamental responsibility of States for nuclear security, Switzerland advocates a comprehensive approach to nuclear security, taking into account nuclear material for not only civilian, but also military, purposes — which constitutes about 83 per cent of all fissile materials worldwide. In this context, Switzerland supported a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-proliferation on the issue of "Improving the security of all nuclear materials: legal, political and institutional options to advance international oversight".

41. *The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.*

Switzerland maintains strong physical protection measures. Switzerland will hold an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2018 and encourages all States parties to invite such missions on a regular basis, to implement the recommendations of such missions in a timely manner and to make the results publicly available with due regard to the principles of confidentiality.

In our view, INFCIRC/225 is a key document in the physical protection of nuclear material and has become a standard reference for IAEA Member States. This publication is intended for use in the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for civil purposes; States may decide whether or not to extend the publication's use to other purposes.

42. *The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.*

Action	Measures taken

Switzerland ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 9 January 1987 and the amendment on 15 October 2008. Switzerland welcomes the entry into force of the amendment on 8 May 2016. Switzerland encourages the IAEA to initiate the preparations for the Review Conference of the amendment to the Convention in 2021, in accordance with article 16, paragraph 1, of the Convention, as amended. Switzerland would like to emphasize that the Review Conference provides an opportunity for Contracting Parties to share experiences on the implementation of the Convention and its amendment.

43. *The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.*

Switzerland remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Switzerland also supports the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (INFCIRC/910).

44. *The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.*

Switzerland hosted a regional meeting on nuclear security information exchange and coordination in October 2017. Switzerland also contributed to the Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017 of the IAEA through extrabudgetary contributions.

45. *The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.*

Switzerland ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 15 October 2008.

46. *The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.*

On the basis of our international legal obligations, Switzerland has established a robust national regulatory control of nuclear material, including a system of accounting.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

47. *Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation*

Action	*Measures taken*

agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies

Nuclear power has been and remains an essential pillar of the Swiss energy policy. In the past 40 years, Switzerland has operated five nuclear power reactors providing roughly 40 per cent of the country's total electricity production. In May 2017, a new Swiss energy policy called Energy Strategy 2050 was adopted by popular referendum. The aim of this strategy is to reduce energy consumption, improve energy efficiency and promote the use of renewable energies.

Under this new energy strategy, no new nuclear power plants will be constructed, but there are no fixed dates for the shutdown of existing nuclear power plants. These can remain in operation as long as the Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) deems that the operators meet the statutory safety requirements.

At this stage, it seems very probable that Swiss nuclear power plants will be able to operate into the 2030s, which provides enough time to implement our energy transition. Even if Switzerland renounces the construction of new third-generation nuclear power plants, nuclear research will continue and will not be limited by Energy Strategy 2050. Switzerland will continue to invest in national and international research on nuclear fission and fusion.

The continued production of electricity in our existing nuclear power plants, the future decommissioning of nuclear power plants and the search for sites for the deep storage of radioactive waste will ensure that Switzerland remains involved in the nuclear sector for decades to come.

48. *Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy*

See action 39.

49. *Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world*

Switzerland supports the efforts of the IAEA to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

In 2015, we provided €400,000 to several projects:

- "Strengthening capabilities for radionuclide measurement in the environment and enhancing QA/QS system for environmental radioactivity monitoring" (€100,000).
- "Enhancing education and training in human health through quality assurance" (€100,000).
- "Support for a regional workshop to enhance African Member States' capacities in cancer registries to ensure quality control of cancer registry activities, analysing and reporting cancer data, and using cancer data for evidence-based decision-making" (€100,000).

Action	Measures taken

- "Support for the imPACT Reviews for the assessment of a country's cancer burden and its readiness to implement cancer control programmes" (€100,000).

In 2016, we supported the project "Developing a national radioactivity monitoring capacity". The aim is to improve informed decision-making of government authorities regarding radiation contamination and management of natural resources (€80,000).

Furthermore, in 2015 we supported the ReNuAL Project with €95,000 for the renovation of Seibersdorf Laboratories, and in 2017 we provided €100,000 for the ReNuAL+ Project.

50. *Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.*

Switzerland supports the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy of the IAEA. Additionally, we supported the ongoing Peaceful Uses Initiative project on enhancing education and training in human health through quality assurance.

51. *Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.*

See responses to actions 35, 36 and 38.

52. *Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.*

Switzerland is of the view that the IAEA technical cooperation in various fields and in cooperation with other international organizations represents an essential contribution to sustainable development as well as to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. It is therefore in the interest of all IAEA Member States — whether donors or recipients — to ensure that the resources available are used effectively to achieve maximum results. Following the introduction of the due account mechanism in 1995, improved levels of payments to the Technical Cooperation Fund were observed for more than a decade. In order to strengthen the mechanism subsequently, a revised version was proposed and discussions among Member States were initiated. Switzerland is convinced that strengthening the current guidelines on the application of the due account mechanism would provide a positive impetus for contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund in general. Switzerland supports the view that each Member State benefiting from the technical cooperation should fully pay its financial contribution for the implementation of its national technical cooperation programmes. This should be the underlying basic principle.

53. *Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.*

See response to action 52.

54. *Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.*

Action	*Measures taken*
	See responses to actions 33 and 49 for information on Switzerland's contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.
55.	*Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.* From 2015 to 2017, Switzerland contributed the sum of €675,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative.
56.	*Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.* Switzerland is actively cooperating with other nuclear safety authorities to support capacity-building. In particular, Switzerland has supported the nuclear safety regulatory authorities from Iran, Poland and Slovenia on a wide variety of topics, ranging from ageing management of nuclear installations to a management system and safety culture.
57.	*Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.* See responses to actions 24, 28 and 42 for information on the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The legal basis for Switzerland's nuclear energy policy was revised in February 2005, becoming the Nuclear Energy Act and the Nuclear Energy Ordinance. In 2009, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI), the national regulatory body with responsibility for the nuclear safety and security of Swiss nuclear facilities, was established. ENSI is an independent body constituted under public law.
58.	*Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.* Switzerland supported the establishment of the low enriched uranium bank by the IAEA.
59.	*Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,*

Action	Measures taken

the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.

Switzerland ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 12 September 1996. Since its entry into force, the Convention has undergone various developments with regard to its review process. At the Review Meeting held in 2014, Switzerland proposed to amend the Convention in order to improve the design and the construction measures of new, as well as existing, nuclear power plants. It was not possible at that time to reach consensus on amending the Convention. But, as a result, the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety was adopted by consensus at a diplomatic conference in February 2015. Contracting Parties committed themselves to increasing transparency, strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention and making the review process more rigorous. The seventh Review Meeting of the Convention, held in spring 2017 in Vienna, reaffirmed the commitment of States parties to the implementation of the Declaration. This ensures that the Declaration remains a reference document for future review processes within the Convention. The IAEA can play a vital role in further promoting the universalization of the principles of the Declaration, as demonstrated in the IAEA General Conference resolution of 2017 on nuclear safety. Member States have encouraged the IAEA to further enhance the mutual sharing of experience and information exchange in the field of safety improvements at existing nuclear power plants.

Switzerland ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident on 31 May 1988.

Switzerland ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency on 31 May 1988.

Switzerland ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management on 5 April 2000.

See responses to actions 42 and 45 for more information on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

60. *Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.*

International cooperation is a cornerstone in the independent oversight activities of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). ENSI is extensively involved in European associations of regulators such as the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association, which ENSI has chaired since the end of 2011. Since 2016, ENSI has represented Switzerland on the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards, and ENSI is represented in all IAEA Safety Standards Committees, including the new Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. Bilateral cooperation agreements exist with Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Poland, the United States of America and the European Union. Switzerland has yearly meetings of its bilateral commissions with its neighbours Austria, France, Germany and Italy. In September 2014, ENSI implemented a comprehensive strategy for international cooperation with other countries and international

Action	*Measures taken*
	organizations. The aim of the strategy is to improve nuclear safety and security on a continuous basis and to strengthen nuclear supervision in Switzerland through active participation in the international exchange of regulatory information and experience.
61.	*Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.*
	In January and February 2016, approximately 20 kg of plutonium owned by Switzerland was transported to the United States under strict safety and security precautions. The material had been safely stored under IAEA safeguards in Switzerland since the 1960s.
62.	*Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.*
	Transport regulations in Switzerland are based on international regulations regarding the transport of hazardous goods and the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.
63.	*Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.*
	Switzerland ratified the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, amended by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (Paris Convention), which to date has not entered into force.
	However, the liability regime in Switzerland is based on the Paris Convention as amended by the Protocol of 1982. The principles of the Swiss liability regime are strict and exclusive liability (channelled to the operator), not limited in amount and with compulsory financial security.
64.	*The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.*
	Switzerland notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the fifty-third session of the IAEA General Conference that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the IAEA statute.